Virtuality and Ernest Bloch: hope and subjectivity by Ellis, D. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROAR, the University of East London Institutional Repository: http://roar.uel.ac.uk  
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this 
item and our policy information available from the repository home page for further 
information. 
 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription.  
 
Author(s): Darren Ellis and Ian Tucker 
Article Title: Virtuality and Ernest Bloch: hope and subjectivity 
Year of publication: 2012 
Citation: Ellis, D. and Tucker, I. (2012) ‘Virtuality and Ernest Bloch: hope and 
subjectivity’. Subjectivity, 4(4), 434-450. DOI: 10.1057/sub.2011.15 
 
Link to published version:  
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/sub/journal/v4/n4/full/sub201115a.html 
 
Publisher statement:  
“This is a pre-print of an article published in Subjectivity. The definitive publisher-
authenticated version is available online at: http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/sub/journal/v4/n4/full/sub201115a.html” 
 
Information on how to cite items within roar@uel: 
http://www.uel.ac.uk/roar/openaccess.htm#Citing  
This is a pre-publication version of Ellis, D & Tucker, I. M. (2011). Virtuality and Ernst 
Bloch: Hope and subjectivity, Subjectivity (2011) 4, 434–450. doi:10.1057/sub.2011.15 
 
 
 
Virtuality and Ernst Bloch: Hope and subjectivity 
 
Darren Ellis, and Ian Tucker 
Psychosocial Studies, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East 
London, Docklands Campus, University Way, London, E16 2RD, UK. 
E-mail: d.ellis@uel.ac.uk 
School of Psychology, University of East London, Stratford Campus, Water Lane, 
London, E15 4LZ, UK. 
E-mail: i.tucker@uel.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Theories of affect have become an increasingly popular tool with which to 
conceptualise and analyse subjectivity. Of particular interest to us in this article are 
expositions that have sought to bring to the forefront of analysis notions of excess and 
virtuality on the grounds that they bear fruit in relation to a potential politics of change. 
Although contemporary notions of virtuality and excess are highly attractive, they also 
bring us to one of the more unsettling features of affect theory: How is it possible to 
suitably analyse the realms of virtuality and excess due to their non-representational 
qualities? To begin to address this problem, we explore process-oriented theories of 
virtuality in relation to the Marxist process theory of Ernst Bloch, and draw on the recent 
protest movements against cuts to Higher Education funding as an example of what we 
term ‘affective hope’, a concept indebted to Bloch’s notion of educated hope. 
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Introduction 
 
Theories of affect have become an increasingly popular tool with which 
to conceptualise and analyse subjectivity, due to their apparent power to 
unravel some of the complexity within which the psychological and social 
intertwine and knot. As witnessed in this journal (Blackman et al, 2008; 
Clough, 2008; Frosh, 2008; Venn, 2009), particular theories of affect 
have the potential to offer very socially aware and expansive ideas of 
subjectivity. It is upon and within this wave of engagements with theories 
of affect that we would like to begin our journey with subjectivity. Of 
particular interest to us are expositions that have sought to bring to the 
forefront of analysis notions of excess and virtuality (which have been 
heavily influenced by the writings of Bergson, Deleuze and Massumi 
(Clough, 2007)), on the grounds that they bear fruit in relation to a 
potential politics of change. Although these notions of virtuality and excess 
are highly attractive, they also bring us to one of the more unsettling features 
of affect theory: how is it possible to suitably analyse the realms of virtuality 
and excess due to their non-representational qualities? It becomes likened to 
the dark matter of physics, a unifying theory, but nonetheless absolutely 
hypothetical. In an attempt to bring light to the matter, we explore the 
similarities and points of difference between the aforementioned process oriented 
theories of virtuality and the Marxist process theory of Ernst Bloch, 
with the latter a rare part of contemporary social theory despite offering 
some very relevant contributions to the more recent explorations of affect. 
Bloch, we argue, offers some seeds of hope in this area mainly through the 
conceptualisations he develops of excess. We introduce readers to what we see 
as relevant aspects of Bloch’s work, before focusing particularly on his attempts 
and urges for us to utilise a kind of ‘affective’ engagement with theory in order 
to be explicitly disposed in endeavours to bring about better futures. 
 
In doing so, we follow Ben Anderson’s (2006a, b) Bloch-influenced work, 
in which he develops a model of thinking of hope, for critical geography. 
Anderson’s attraction to Bloch revolves around the notion that hope can 
become a viable theoretical tool for re-conceptualising some of the maladies 
of our social worlds (for example, anxiety, depression, sorrow). Anderson’s 
critical geography approach argues that Bloch’s writings on hope, when 
supplemented with contemporary theories of affect, can help develop a model 
of geography that is utopic rather than purely critical (for example, a sense 
of reconstructive rather than deconstructive). We draw on some of Anderson’s 
ideas regarding Bloch’s work on hope, and use them to develop an approach 
that contributes to contemporary social scientific theories of affect, themselves 
focused on understanding the changing nature of subjectivity. This 
requires us to be openly engaged enough to affect and be affected by what 
Bloch describes as ‘hope’ and its excessive existence. More specifically, while 
an approach to affect formulated via the work of Brian Massumi directs us 
towards the potential excessive nature of virtuality, but crucially as not 
reducible to the possibilities of the present, Bloch offers a way to think of what 
we term ‘affective hope’ as focused on excess and the virtual unknown of the 
future, but as grounded in the possibilities of present everyday life. We draw on 
the recent protest movements against cuts to Higher Education funding as an 
example of new collective forms of affective hope, indebted to Bloch’s notion of 
educated hope, which can act as political forces attempting to form better 
futures that operate at the intersection of the possible, potential and virtual. 
 
Relational Affect 
 
The ‘turn to affect’, as it is increasingly becoming known, has emerged across 
social and cultural theory in recent years through an interest in using ‘affect’ as 
a way to think about the inter-relational production of forms of subjectivity 
(Blackman and Cromby, 2007; Gregg and Seigworth, 2010). Such moves 
arose largely through a desire to re-calibrate analysis of subjectivity towards 
notions of embodiment and relationality. This is in part the result of critiques 
of the efforts of discursive theories that have been seen to reduce the formation 
of subjectivities through patterns of discursive interaction and/or positioning 
(Brown and Tucker, 2010). In addition to this, affect has become a 
driving force for models that present forms of subjectivity as produced by 
processes rather than existing as substances. It is this move that has led to the 
distancing of affect from emotion, as the latter is so often used as a referent 
for the internalising of culturally recognised patterns of being (Blackman 
and Cromby, 2007). Affect has come to be used to point to the patterns of force 
that bodies (human and non-human) have upon one another, and as such 
has become a concept used to orient analysis towards the formation of 
subjectivities through patterns of relationality (or forms of becoming for 
Deleuze). Although diverse in nature, many contemporary theories of affect 
have been influenced by Spinozist thought, the idea that activity is produced 
through the relational forces that exist between bodies, rather than driven 
by internalised drives. 
 
The term ‘affect’ has developed a number of meanings in recent times, with 
Gregg and Seigworth (2010) pointing to no less than eight theoretical 
trajectories founded on the term (and they state this is an inexhaustive list). 
The trajectory we follow is that owing much to Brian Massumi’s (2002) 
Spinozist-Deleuzian-flavoured transition from emotion to affect as a means 
of reinstating a notion of ‘movement’ and process into cultural theory. 
Massumi’s concerns for cultural theory are similar to problems in critical 
psychology and the social sciences more generally. Namely, the tendency for 
critically discursive theories to end at a point of stability (largely through 
positioning), however fragile or temporary that may be (Brown and Tucker, 
2010). In such theories, emphasis remains on how subjects and objects are 
formed, and the ways they are ‘fixed’ in society. While such work is valuable, 
it does not allow for an adequate notion of change, through pointing to the 
existence of the potential for alternative modes of subjectivity, that an emphasis 
on movement can better highlight. Affect, for Massumi, offers a way out of this 
cul-de-sac. Through affect, movement can return to analysis. Massumi states: 
 
Position no longer comes first, with movement a problematic second. It is 
secondary to movement and derived from it. It is retro movement, 
movement residue. The problem is no longer to explain how there can be 
change given positioning. The problem is to explain the wonder that there 
can be stasis given the primacy of process. (Massumi, 2002, pp. 7–8) 
 
Massumi endeavours to pin down specific features of affective activity. 
The emphasis on relationality, on the formation of individual subjectivities 
through forces that are relational not stable entities, results in locating force 
between rather than in people. However, this means that it is not possible 
to locate the place where affect can be seen. For Massumi it is not a substance, 
but a processural force. This force Massumi sees as ‘virtual’, as it cannot 
be located or identified in any one thing. It is through virtual forces that patterns 
of subjectivity are extracted, through processes of selection that in turn form 
actualised states. For Massumi, emotions become actualised forms of virtuality, 
formed and understood through grids of socio-linguistic meaning, whereas 
affect acts as a means to tune into virtual forces. The trajectory that Massumi 
develops is one indebted to the work of Spinoza and Bergson before him, 
and how their ideas were taken up in the work of Deleuze. Specifically, this 
is around the notions of virtual-actual and affect as a relational force between 
bodies. In discussing how Deleuze (re)drew this line from Spinoza to Bergson, 
Massumi states: 
 
Affect or intensity in the present account is akin to what is called a critical 
point, or a bifurcation point, or singular point, in chaos theory and the 
theory of dissipative structures. This is the turning point at which a 
physical system paradoxically embodies multiple and normally mutually 
exclusive potentials, only one of which is ‘selected’. (2002, pp. 32–33) 
 
This idea of processes of selection working from a broader set of possible 
futures brings with it notions of potential change through introducing an 
‘excess’ of experience. If activity is produced through selection, this means that 
a wider field of alternative options exists, from which the selective process 
proceeds. This is to follow Spinoza’s (1996) claim that bodies are most 
appropriately thought in terms of what they can do, meaning a vast range of 
potential bodily doings exists than those that we are aware of. Our bodies 
‘move and feel’ and their capacity to do this is beyond our perception and 
knowledge of them. Here virtuality is taken as a proponent of change, with 
actuality referring to the everyday lived material world. Virtuality then speaks 
for the ever-present excess that Massumi takes as core to experience. It is this 
excess, that which cannot be known, where Massumi claims potentiality 
resides. This potentiality is the main medium for change; it works as the force 
for a dynamic model of life to emphasise an anti-essentialist philosophy of 
change. It is here that seeds of change and liberation begin to emerge, in locating 
the ever-present productive force of the virtual, through which creation can 
emerge. Massumi states in reference to affect that: 
 
When the continuity of affective escape is put into words, it tends to 
take on positive connotations. For it is nothing less than the perception 
of one’s own vitality, one’s sense of aliveness, of changeability (often 
signified as ‘freedom’). (2002, p. 36) 
 
Taken here, affect is a dynamic process of change (or difference) that emerges 
through the virtual-actual, which are ‘two facets of the same expression’ 
(Hallward, 2006, p. 35). Affect is perceived from the actual ‘side’ for Massumi 
and what we ‘see’ as affect is the evolution of change from the perspective 
of that which becomes actualised into forms of everyday material life. 
Actualised affective forms do not visibly fold off from virtuality to produce 
the concrete reality of our everyday lives. Rather, we ‘see’ actualised affective 
forms that are mere snapshots of the virtual realm. Moments of present that, 
through perception, we string together to form our perceptual realities. This 
‘excess’, or ‘more’ has become a central feature for Massumi’s work on affect – 
see, for example, Massumi (2002): 
 
What is being termed affect in this essay is precisely this two-sidedness, the 
simultaneous participation of the virtual in the actual and the actual in 
the virtual, as one arises from and returns to the other. Affect is this 
two-sidedness as seen from the side of the actual thing, as couched in its 
perceptions and cognitions. (2002, p. 35) 
 
Such notions of excess in Massumi’s work, we want to argue, offer potentially 
valuable links to Bloch’s discussions of the subject, which he saw as constantly 
unfinished and being made, and crucially, formed in relation to the reality of 
the future as not-yet known or produced. It is the notions of affect as prepersonal 
and excessive that we wish to focus on in this article. This is not to 
dismiss the many and varied alternate accounts of affect (see Blackman and 
Cromby, 2007 for a valuable summary). Rather, it is the realm of unrealised 
potential, along with affect as originating in some way before individuals that 
are of interest, given the possible utility of Bloch’s utopic theory for offering a 
specific mode of affectual thinking, rather than a generalised view that 
affect theory is by definition valuable (see Hemmings, 2005 for useful critique 
of affect along these lines). 
 
Notions of excess exist in concert with ‘virtuality’, with affect as the link 
operating at the cusp of virtuality and actuality. It is this ‘excessive’ nature, 
Massumi’s take on affect, that Ben Anderson (2006a, b) considers can be 
supplemented by the work of Ernst Bloch, as he offers a way of thinking of hope 
that Anderson views as capable of developing a specific empirical approach to 
affect in cultural geography, and one that is attuned to hope, although not in a 
pure or naı¨ve sense. For Anderson, affect theory needs to be able to point to the 
inequalities in Western societies, and consequently address issues of sorrow, 
depression and anxiety. However, it also needs to address these social worlds in 
terms of the empirical management of such negative experiences. It is here, with 
his Marxist leanings, that Bloch’s work on hope as an ‘excessive force’ (through 
the concept of ‘not yet’) can be useful. 
 
The notion of virtual forces introduces newness as a reality, in terms of virtuality 
framing a realm of new actualised forms being produced as part of ongoing 
processes of continuity. The idea of a continuous new is a point of concern for 
Bloch, which he finds with specific reference to Bergson, whose vitalism Bloch 
feels offers no more than an idea of the new. The notion of process and creativity 
moving forward is troublesome in Bloch’s eyes, as if theory goes no further than to 
posit the new, without specifying any form of end point, or at least, a product of 
process. For instance, his concern with Bergson that ‘process remains empty and 
repeatedly produces nothing but process’ (1996, p. 201). 
 
Bloch though was writing at a time before renewed engagements with process 
philosophies across social and cultural theory, in which concepts of virtuality 
and affect have re-emerged as concepts of change. As such, drawing links 
between contemporary affect theory and Bloch’s writings could prove valuable. 
As we have seen, with a notion of process comes change, and it was this that 
was fundamental for Bloch, specifically in terms of change for the better, and it 
is his concept of hope that is central to his thinking of change. Similarly, the 
renewed focus on theories of affect has been criticised on the grounds that affect 
has become a fashionable term for introducing notions of ungrounded 
experience and moving away from common patterns of being, without offering 
much by way of replacement (Hemmings, 2005). This resonates with the ‘not 
yet’ nature of affect theory (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010), the ‘excessive yet to be 
captured or organised into a knowable form’ that emerges when one resists 
reducing experience down to pre-figured visible individualised forms. The 
question then becomes how to treat this ‘not yet’ element? It is here that a 
notion of excess and virtuality featured in Massumi’s work on affect can be 
potentially augmented by Bloch’s writings on hope, in terms of working towards 
a theory of a specific form of affect, namely affective hope. 
 
The Not-Yet-Conscious 
 
Bloch’s writings on hope feature as a central part of his philosophy 
of subjectivity. In The Principle of Hope (1995), Bloch’s three-volume treatise, 
which was written over two decades – from 1938 to 1959 – and in two 
continents (Germany and America), he produces a profusion of theories and 
philosophises on human culture – from art to politics and from religion to 
science – that are obscure at times (to say the least) but also offer to the reader 
not just simply a work of literary interest, but also possible ways of thinking, 
feeling and mobilising subjectivity. His process theory appears much more 
positively future oriented than recent theorising in terms of directing thought 
towards new modes of hopeful being; and Bloch was quite hostile to his 
contemporary theorists who developed what he saw as nihilistic positions 
without any hope for the future of humanity. 
 
Subjectivity for Bloch is regarded as an unfinished mode of being, much more 
related to verbs than any particular noun. It is constantly in a state of striving to 
know the self as the completion of its being lies in the future, its identity is 
hidden: the homo absconditus (Bloch, 1996). Subjectivity is seen to be built 
around what he calls the ‘Not’ that induces the hunger and striving (Bloch, 
1976, p. 3). Although the Not for Bloch is fundamental to the concept of being 
as unfinished and in process, the Not does not itself exist, for example, as it does 
in what he regards as nihilistic philosophies of nothingness, but is rather the 
negation of being. He sees the subject as attempting to reach forward, striving to 
fill the void of the Not: the negation of the negation, but satiation is always 
transitory and hungers again emerge. Bloch argues that it is hope (the dialectical 
agent of the Not) that leads the subject on in its attempt to uncover its hidden 
face. Thus, Bloch’s understanding of the Not is part of his philosophy of process 
that emphasises and relies on a future reality of difference (as Deleuze would 
say), in which life becomes something it currently is not. 
 
The point that demarcates Bloch’s thought from the aforementioned process 
models of affect is that his is concerned to posit a particular mode of futurity, 
namely a more positive one that is created through the very sense of difference that 
a philosophy of ‘not-yet’ brings. For Bloch, the very notion of newness in the 
future is formed through subjectivities ‘open to’ the future, through which the new 
can be made in a better way. For this it relies on the existence of possibility, in 
terms of seeing better futures as emerging from present materiality of life. Hope 
becomes the method through which better possible futures are engaged with in the 
present, and as such are grounded in the possibilities of current individual and 
social environments, and it needs to be learned. 
 
Hope for Bloch is not in any simple sense a type of feeling or dream of a 
better life, it is to be treated with reverence and at times equated with being 
itself. Anderson states, it is ‘frequently likened to the immaterial-matter of 
air’ (Anderson, 2006b, p. 733) and Giroux as ‘anticipatory rather than 
messianic, mobilizing rather than therapeutic’ (Giroux, 2004, p. 38). Bloch 
describes it as ‘the most human of all mental feelings’ (Bloch, 1996, p. 74), 
an ‘anticipated freedom to be-for-oneself’ (Bloch, 1976). Quoting Hegel, 
Bloch states that the subject in a state of freedom ‘finds nothing alien and has 
no limits or barriers in that which confronts him, but rather finds himself’ 
(ibid.), the content of hope lies where ‘the absolute is no longer encumbered’ 
(ibid., p. 7). Thus, hope is an affective state of anticipation, an anticipated 
movement towards that which is not-yet-become. It can be conceived as 
residing in what Massumi determines as the virtual sphere (excessive to a state 
of being), but importantly, it can also be actively engaged with and sought as 
it resides in potential (seed-like) form, as will be discussed. 
 
Bloch makes a distinction between ‘reality and what has become real’ (Bloch, 
1996, p. 157). What has become real is static, lacks potentiality and is unchangeable. 
Bloch refers to these kinds as only objectively possible. ‘Objectively 
possible is everything whose entry, on the basis of a mere partial-cognition of its 
existing conditions, is scientifically to be expected or at least cannot be 
discounted’ (Bloch, 1996, p. 196). These have ‘fixed definitions of essence’ 
(Bloch, 1996, p. 1373). What emerges as having become real, and in this respect 
Bloch concurs with Bergson, is thought of as impoverished perceptions of reality, 
‘snapshots’ conceived through present needs and social contexts, or what may 
popularly be considered as facts or ‘matters of fact’. Similarly, Massumi asserts 
that ‘matter-of-factness dampens intensity’ (Massumi, 1996, p. 86). In contrast, 
‘reality’, for Bloch, belongs to the realm of the possible or what he calls the 
 
really possible which is everything whose conditions in the sphere of the 
object itself are not yet fully assembled: whether because they are still 
maturing, or above all because new conditions – though mediated with the 
existing ones – arise for the entry of a new Real. (Bloch, 1996, p. 196) 
 
The really possible occurs on the ‘Front’ of the not-yet, a site where present and 
future meet through ‘Vor-Schein’, an experience or a foreglow of future 
possibilities, utopian possibilities (Geoghegan, 1997, p. 37). These we might 
experience through, for example, works of art and religion. The emphasis on the 
power of the arts to produce new forms of experience, and consequently modes 
of subjectivity, also features in Gilles Deleuze’s discussions on the originators of 
difference and the new: art and literature being capable of offering new forms 
of sensation, feeling and affectual connections, which in turn provide the 
productive constituents of subjectivity. The synergies of the thoughts of Bloch 
and Deleuze are strong here (and potentially offer a way forward from Bloch’s 
earlier criticisms of Bergson). What is central to Bloch’s desire for difference and 
the not-yet is that the future has the capacity to be better than the ‘present-past’. 
Bloch’s writings emerge from the wider context of utopian writings. He works 
this through a general understanding and focus on hope, to the creation of a 
specific concept tasked with offering a specific mode of subjectivity that 
recognises and engages with the future as offering experience beyond what is 
currently known, which he terms the docta spes (educated hope). 
 
A Hopeful Surplus 
 
A major aspect of educated hope, it seems, for Bloch concerns the ability to 
distinguish between abstract (immature dreams) and concrete (mature dreams) 
forms of utopia. Abstract utopia is simply wishful thinking without any wilful 
application for change, whereas concrete utopia reaches forward hopefully 
and wilfully to real possible futures. Levitas suggests, ‘[W]hilst abstract utopia 
may express desire, only concrete utopia carries hope’ (Levitas, 1997, p. 67). 
It is the process of extracting concrete hope from the abstract that produces 
the application of a docta spes: ‘[T]he task is to recover the core of concrete 
utopia from the dross of the abstract elements in which it is embedded’ (Levitas, 
1997, p. 71). The distinction between ‘desire’ and ‘hope’ bears a slight 
resemblance to Deleuze’s notion of ‘desire’. The way that Deleuze used the 
term denotes underlying affective processes that are non-conscious, rather than, 
for example, a conscious desire for financial wealth. The latter, for Deleuze, is 
more related to what is commonly termed ‘interest’ that provokes cognized 
rational processes, through which, for example, one becomes financially 
wealthy. Desire underlies the interest, but is subject to (invested in) the social 
formations or conditions under which the interest is made possible (for 
example, capitalism). 
 
Desire, therefore for Deleuze, is never our own. It is produced through 
the conditions of the capitalist infrastructure in which we live, and so for 
Deleuze, desire is essentially schizophrenic. Bloch does not see hope in quite 
same way, but nonetheless, he felt it is conditioned through societal infrastructure 
and of course determines and influences activity. Bloch, however, adds 
that the investments that hope are attached to can be reformulated through the 
docta spes. The docta spes can be considered as a process of learning to be 
affected by hope and in turn affecting hope, an experimenting with an 
unfinished, open, not-yet-determined world. It is human performative practice 
in learning to decide which possible future is best actualised; this requires both 
a feelingful endeavour and a directing act of a cognitive kind (Levitas, 1997, 
p. 66). Bloch describes docta spes as ‘a methodical organ for the New, an 
objective aggregate form of what is coming up’ (Bloch, 1996, p. 157). Hence, 
Levitas argues that it ‘operates as a dialectic between reason and passion’ 
(Levitas, 1997, p. 70). 
 
There have been a number of criticisms of Bloch’s distinction between the 
abstract and concrete (Zipes, 1988; Levitas, 1997). Bloch has a tendency to 
label any philosophical positions that do not match up to his as irrational 
and bourgeois (Zipes, 1988). Levitas states that the docta spes is an intrinsically 
evaluative concept, ‘which cannot be made other than through the specification 
of the content of the good society, and through judgments about the 
possibility and desirability of different aspirations toward the good life’ 
(Levitas, 1997, p. 78). Kellner makes the point that Bloch’s politicization of 
cultural critique forces one to make political evaluations of cultural artefacts, 
though one may make different judgements, and utilize different political 
perspectives, than Bloch (Kellner, 1997). Further, Anderson argues that there 
is an alternative, perhaps less dogmatic understanding of utopianism put 
forward throughout Bloch’s work. It can be seen as ‘a distinctive type of process 
in which something better is “not-yet” and thus has disruptive, excessive 
qualities’ (Anderson, 2006a, p. 698) through which to attune ‘to utopia as 
a distinctive type of process that opens up the present through plural, 
underdetermined, “goods” or “betters” ’(Anderson, 2006a, p. 700). Levy 
argues that utopia for Bloch is not an end point or the ‘ “end” of all movement 
and development, but “end” as a future that opens up “endless” new 
possibilities y a potential realization of the possible’ (Levy, 1997, p. 176). 
Similarly, Giroux writes: 
 
Rather than seeing it as an individual proclivity, we must see hope as part 
of a broader politics that acknowledges those social, economic, spiritual, 
and cultural conditions in the present that make certain kinds of agency 
and democratic politics possible. (Giroux, 2004, p. 38) 
 
Thus, Anderson (2006a, p. 707) suggests that Bloch’s endeavour is calling for us 
to change the verb ‘critical’ in the context of analysis, which usually points to 
deconstruction, to ‘utopic’, which connotes an additional re-constructive 
process. For Bloch, then, it is the ‘theory-practice of reaching home or of 
departure from inappropriate objectification; through it the world is developed 
towards the No-Longer-Alienation of its subjects-objects, hence towards 
freedom’ (Bloch, 1996, p. 210). In addition, the move from abstract to concrete 
utopia could be seen as a process of actualising the virtual, formed through 
processes of selecting different modes of subjectivity. The way that experience 
comes to be as part of the wider virtual stream. This though would be to miss 
the utopic element of Bloch’s work, namely the problem of what to make of 
a concept that emphasises change and potential (for a better life in Bloch’s 
terms), and does so by spending considerable effort claiming that futures will 
be different to the past-present and are not determined by them. Bloch seeks to 
move beyond this ontology of difference through offering the concept of 
‘educated hope’. A concept tasked with creating a mode of making virtuality, 
without reducing it to actualised forms, which would be to negate its creative 
force. 
 
We want to stress, however, that we are not offering Bloch’s understanding 
of educated hope as a method in any dogmatic sense of the word, but it is more 
about a spirit, an attitude or an affective disposition. What Bloch seeks to do 
is to create an embodied mode of being that is hopeful, formed through affective 
engagement with the future world. In such a model, the affective architecture of 
the present organises itself in such a way as to promote hopeful surges into the 
future. The utopic tendencies of this position shine through Bloch’s work, and 
yet, the emphasis on hopeful modes of somatic activity offers a potential model 
of subjectivity in relation to affect and virtuality that is grounded in the present. 
It presents a notion of present-day organisation of somatic relationality in such 
a way that carves into the future with a hope for the better. Of course, 
suggesting the future will be better is a utopic enterprise. What Bloch does is to 
encourage a hopeful affective state, an idea that can usefully supplement 
engagements with affect that introduce a realm of ineffable change through 
notions of excess and virtuality. 
 
Bloch’s docta spes involves the dissolving of the relationship between 
psychological and social, through the relation of socio-cultural events and 
psychological activity, each stage in the process acting as a moment of 
inspiration that are bound up and produced as complex psychosocial 
phenomena. This is central to Bloch’s futurity, through which he marks out a 
genuine new (Novum). Rather than the failings, as he sees them, of Bergson’s 
process philosophy to create anything beyond process, Bloch endeavours to lay 
down a model of future production formed through educated hope, the full 
culmination of which he sees as occurring only at very special moments, formed 
through the combined forces of particular individuals and socio-cultural 
contexts. Bloch draws on history for evidence for this, for instance, Descartes’s 
production of the cogito ergo sum, which occurred through the relation 
and combination of bourgeois society and a particular highly talented 
individual. The notion of the ‘special moment’ is one we take up in our version 
of collective educated hope, or affective hope, that we see currently in the rise of 
mass protest movements marking the present time as a very ‘special’ one in 
history. 
 
Hope for Education and Educated Hope 
 
Our focus on hope is one that views it as a tentative, unfinished process. 
Something that is created as a force between bodies, shifting the bodies’ capacity 
to be affected and to affect. By way of an example of this process, we would 
like to consider the recent protests in the United Kingdom against Government 
cuts to Higher Education funding. Such cuts revolve around an increase in 
student fees, and have been the subject of several protest marches in the centre 
of London in the winter of 2010. We would like to consider this example 
of these protests in terms of the embodied subjectivity produced by the police 
crowd containment strategy known colloquially as ‘kettling’. This strategy 
was used in the later protests in 2010 as a means to contain thousands of 
protestors in the Parliament Square area of central London, directly in front of 
the Houses of Parliament. This tactic involves the prevention of movement in 
and out of the containment area, which is enforced by hundreds of police with 
‘riot gear’ (that is, batons, helmets and shields). Most protestors caught up in 
the ‘kettling’ were not prepared to be ‘kettled’, and were shocked, scared and 
angry to find themselves enforcedly restricted by police for several hours on a 
cold winter’s night, with no food, water or sanitation facilities provided. 
 
This restricted space can be thought of as a multiple relational production 
of connections between the bodies of protestors and police. Affect is not a 
pre-figured happening in the contained space, but could name the variation in 
what the bodies can and cannot do in that particular time and space. The 
potentially positive affectual experience of feeling one can make a difference 
through protest occurring earlier in the march shifting to the intimidated fearful 
experience of being subject to forceful entrapment upon containment in 
Parliament Square. As Massumi notes, affect is not residing within any of the 
subjects of objects present, such as the protestors, police, batons, shields or the 
contained space itself, but is the processes of variation through which life 
emerges at that time. As such, it is pre-personal (subjects being products of 
it rather than producers of it), and excessive (it does not reside within subjects 
of objects). 
 
Hope exists as an affective force on the earlier march as the collective 
embodied coming together to attempt to successfully resist the proposed cuts 
to funding. Hope is set amid the anger and despair of the funding cuts, and 
hence is not a ‘pure’ form of positivity. It is intrinsically linked to negative 
affects, but it is nevertheless a means through which collective protest 
emerges at that space and time. It is not a property of the protestors as 
individuals, but a relational embodied product that forms the collective. 
Later on, when faced with the reality of being ‘kettled’ for several hours on a 
very cold winter’s night, the mood changes, with anger, fear and intimidation 
felt by protestors, leading to some altercations with police. Such reactions 
become alternative forms of hope connected to the negative reactions of 
anger and fear. Hope here becomes not about trying to successfully resist 
proposed cuts, but of leaving a sudden unexpected and sometimes brutal 
imprisonment in Parliament Square. The organisation of hope changes scale, 
from the level of parliamentary legislation to localised spatial escape. The 
situation is primed for change. For instance, a small group of protestors 
charge what they perceive to be a weakness in the police line and break 
through, darting through the garden of the Ministry of Defence government 
building and climbing over railings to ensure their freedom. This is embodied 
hope achieving a potential. 
 
This demonstrates a specific example of hope as an ‘excessive’ embodied 
relational affectual subjectivity. Not about the individual’s stable emotional 
engagement with external events, but as multiple processes of variation. Hope is 
seen as the fluid movement between affectual experiences that are indelibly 
bound up in frustration, anger and sadness at the proposed cuts to funding, and 
works as an organising force for collective embodied protest. The later ‘kettling’ 
shifts the affective landscape further, combining concerns regarding the 
potential debt of future generations of students with fear for the personal 
safety and comfort of protestors. Hope for successfully resisting legislative 
change shifts to hope for an escape from police containment. 
 
Bloch was clear that educated hope is something that is learned. The 
anti-funding cuts demonstrations can be seen as an education in hope for many 
young people (for example, current secondary-school children, young students) 
who had not experienced such proposed changes to the fiscal landscape as their 
lives to date coincide with a period of economic growth. The demonstrations 
were then initially driven by a hope for education, a new force in the sociopolitical 
landscape. It was a hope fuelled by both passionate and cognizant 
awareness of the potential for developing better futures. For Bloch, this is a 
concretisation of hope as it is embodied as activity seeking better futures. 
Therefore, the demonstration by definition cannot be conceived as simply 
wishful thinking, but wilful application. 
 
Bloch would urge us to look at the positive trajectories that have spun out, 
and other not-yet realised possibilities. For example, the collective resistance 
may be suggestive of new forms of political consciousness emerging among 
the students. Many of the very young students (some of them were of school 
age) had never attended a demonstration before, let alone been kettled. 
Prophetic chants of ‘this is just the beginning’ could be heard, representing for 
Bloch the Vor-Schein (a foreglow of future possibilities). Versions of educated 
hope as collective organisational forms of subjectivity are emerging across 
the globe at the time of writing. The protest movement against cuts to Higher 
Education funding has spread to protests against tax avoidance by companies 
in the United Kingdom. Across the Middle East anti-dictator pro-democracy 
movements have spread from Tunisia, through Egypt and Bahrain to Libya (and 
promise to continue), toppling long-standing dictators. Such protest movements 
against all powerful leaders would have been unthinkable until very 
recent times, due to the threat of violence against anyone speaking out against 
the ruling regime. New forms of hope are being learned as we speak across 
the world, and as such, now is an apt time to introduce Bloch’s work to help 
us understand them, due to his own role in the mass protests of 1968 (Kellner 
and O’Hara, 1976). 
 
Virtuality, Educated Hope and Future Subjectivities 
 
The process of attempting to ‘make the future’ that Bloch states is central to 
achieving a better future is woven around the notion of ‘educated hope’. This 
is not a process of actualising the virtual in Massumi’s terms, but of forging a 
way of a passionate engaging in the present that is cognizant of the reality of 
the burgeoning excess of the future, driven by hope for a better life. What 
distinguishes this from an actualisation of the virtual per se is that it is not 
about forming selective, yet stable, actualised forms of subjectivity (that is, 
emotions), that then form the base of psychological activity, but rather for a 
mode of hope to act as a constant and incessant presence that drives our 
strivings forward (for example, as seen in the proliferation and force of 
protest movements across the globe). The emphasis on excess and the 
unknowable in Massumi’s theory of affect offers a valuable re-focusing on 
change, but does not offer a particular mode of futurity in the way Bloch 
does. Educated hope is about accessing the openness of virtuality, to 
constantly create modes of subjectivity that are ‘open oriented’, not selective 
processes from a wider excess of potential. 
 
What does this mean for subjectivity? For Bloch subjectivity is constantly 
made through opening itself to better possible futures, with this striving for 
the new and improved both coming from a realisation of a reality of better 
possible futures, and in turn making better possible futures. For Bloch, this is 
a circular process. A desire and a production of activity seems a valuable task 
for critical theory, and guards against accusations of over-negativity of critical 
(and deconstructive) modes of engagement. Bloch’s ‘openness’ to the new 
combines here to form subjectivities that are forward-facing and open to the 
new, with the addition of a striving for the future. Anderson’s (2006a, b) 
belief that an engagement with Bloch can act as a force for directing a utopic 
rather than critical geography is a point we would follow in relation to social 
theory more generally. Such efforts have found theories of affect useful 
resources for this, and yet, can fall foul of the transcendental trap of alluding 
to a realm of ineffable virtuality through a notion of excess. Bloch’s educated 
hope can form a catalysing influence on critical theory in understandings of 
subjectivity: first, in positing a version of subjectivity that is process oriented, 
‘virtual’ and yet not lost in a necessary unbidden excess, or actuality; and 
second, to forge modes of critical theory that garner a version of critique that 
is more utopic than purely critical: a move beyond deconstruction towards a 
forward-facing and open re-construction. Where such moves will end cannot 
be known (and as such they remain excessive), but the notion of educated 
hope can potentially point to the power of learning to hope as a collective 
embodied practice, a form of affective hope. This is of course a tricky balance, 
for re-construction implies some kind of structural (re)formation of subjects. 
Nevertheless, a goal of continually theorising ‘open subjectivities’ is well 
assisted by an engagement with Bloch. 
 
The notion of ‘excess’ in work on affect by Massumi, influenced by Spinoza, 
Bergson and Deleuze, which we identify as both an attraction and a problem 
area, can be productively augmented by Bloch’s educated hope. By excess, we 
mean the premise that psychological experience and activity are produced 
through processes of selection on an ongoing basis from a wider set of possible 
relations. As such, an excess of affective possibilities is posited as constantly 
present, and it is through the relation between virtual and actual forces that 
subjectivities are formed. This can be an attraction as a notion of ‘excess’ 
introduces change as an analytic, although, on the other hand, it can raise a 
problem of introducing a realm of unspecified ‘unknown’. Doing the latter 
without falling into a transcendental trap and/or consequently suggesting that 
future experience is somehow dependent on a realm of excessive unknown is a 
challenging task. We seek to demonstrate how an approach informed by Bloch 
can begin to address this. 
 
Specifically, it is the concept of hope that will provide fertile in terms 
of marking out a theory of ‘affective hope’. This theory puts hope forward as 
an affective activity whereby reason and passion are drawn upon to develop 
the power to be affected by hope in the present and hence the ability to 
positively affect possible futures. 
Bloch’s philosophy of hope introduces an interesting potential avenue 
forward for affective theories of subjectivity, first in terms of aligning to ideas 
of process and newness of the future, pointing to how it can be made differently. 
The links here to ideas of virtuality and excess are fruitful, with Bloch arguing 
against previous incarnations that he saw as lacking concrete ideas and versions 
of the new. For Bloch, just theoretically laying out process is not a viable 
way of creating a genuine new, one not reducible to past or present. The push to 
hope and incumbent factors of hoping for a better future are admirable and 
welcome. An integral part of critical theory should always be a sense of improvement, 
which is central to Bloch’s writings. For this reason, a contemporary 
engagement with them is worth exploring. The notion of constantly producing 
‘open subjectivities’ appears valuable, although a question remains about the 
relationship between virtuality and possibility. If, as Bloch states, the future is 
entirely bound to the possibilities of the present, it can mean that the future is no 
different from the present: ‘[W]hat difference can there be between the existent 
and the non-existent if the non-existent is already possible’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994, p. 263). The argument follows that if the future is already 
possible it is not genuinely different from the present, as it already exists in 
the present as a possibility. 
 
To be genuinely new (which Bloch was attempting), the future must exceed 
the possible, and consequently not already exist as a possibility. Massumi 
(2002) takes up this point in stating ‘[T]he actual occurs at the point of 
intersection of the possible, the potential, and the virtual: three modes of 
thought’ (p. 136). It is within this three-form model that we argue Bloch’s 
educated hope can stand. Massumi is suggesting that the actuality of (new) 
future modes of being emerge through the combination of possibility, 
potentiality and virtuality. Such a formulation offers a way of integrating 
Bloch’s ‘hopeful possibility’ with process models of futurity emphasising 
genuine newness through virtuality. For subjectivity, this can mean that hope 
as an affectual relation can exist as a possibility, working in line with virtuality 
as an open system towards the new. The protests movements altering 
geopolitical landscapes across the world provide ample evidence of new forms 
of collective affective hope at work. Perhaps then it is the time for a new politics 
of change to emerge. 
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